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Abstract
This paper examines endogenous merger formations in mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a
solution concept, we analyze what market structure(s) remains stable when each firm is allowed to
merge with any other in a mixed Cournot industry composed of three firms: two symmetric private
firms and an inefficient public firm. We show that a state where a single private firm and a public
firm merge is always stable although stable market structures vary according to the cost condition of
the public firm. This suggests that both social welfare and the profit of each firm become relatively
high in the duopoly resulting from a merger between a private and a public firm. Furthermore, this
state can be achieved from an initial mixed oligopoly among the three firms.
JEL Classification: L11, L32, L41
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1 Introduction
It is empirically and theoretically known that a merger works as a means towards cost reduction for the
merged firm. In this context, it has a positive effect on enhancing welfare in the market by reducing the
cost of production. However, it also has a negative effect on welfare because it decreases the competitive
pressure on the market. The latter effect deteriorates welfare so severely that the merger guidelines
adopted in several countries prescribe that a merger must be proposed to and regulated by the anti-trust
†Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: kami-jo@suou.waseda.jp (Y. Kamijo), yasu-net.system@asagi.waseda.jp
(Y. Nakamura).
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authority, even if the proposed and thus agreed merger is profitable for the participants.1 However, in
the case of a merger involving a public enterprise, this is not the case.2 The owner of the public firm,
i.e., the government is concerned with social welfare. Because the owner of the public firm would never
approve a merger that causes a deleterious change in social welfare, such a merger involving the public
firm always improves social welfare.
In this paper, we analyze endogenous merger decisions in a mixed oligopoly where two private firms
and one public firm compete in a homogeneous goods market. It is assumed that the public firm is less
efficient in production than the two private firms.3 As is mentioned above, since a merger between private
and public firms never damages social welfare as long as the decision to merge is by their own incentives,
our focus is on whether the public and private enterprises agree to merge. We also examine how the
market structure evolves with a merger activity involving public firms.
Moreover, this study has some impact on the growing literature on the privatization policy of public
firms. A merger between public and private firms can be seen as a means of introducing the private
sector’s technology to the public, and thus can be a partial privatization of the public enterprise. One
advantage of our study is that the merger among private and public firms involves two main effects related
to a privatization policy. The first is cost reduction through privatization. A public firm with inefficient
technology improves its productivity after a merger with an efficient private firm. The second is a change
in the objective of the firm after privatization. The firm, post-privatization is partially owned by a private
owner who is concerned with ensuring the profit of the privatized firm. As a result, the partially privatized
firm has to not only pursue social welfare but also consider both the profit alongside. In literature on a
mixed oligopoly, however, privatization is seen as no more than a tool for changing the objective of the
public firm, without any consideration of the effect of cost reduction through privatization.4 Thus, we
provide a model of privatization in which both cost reduction and change in the objective of the firm are
considered, if a merger involving a public firm is interpreted as one of the forms of privatization policy.
A study on an endogenous decision to merge is useful in understanding “the evolution of industry
structure over times as coalitions form and regroup”(Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983, p187). A
situation that prevails after a long fight of merger activities should satisfy a stability condition. Thus,
we consider a stable merger where the owners of firms have no incentive to merge or break off the merger
as the first characterization of our goal. In other words, we apply the core concept in cooperative game
1The effects of a horizontal merger on the profits of the insiders and the outsiders in the merger and social welfare are
traditionally studied with equilibrium analysis. See Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983); Perry and Porter (1985); Farrell
and Shapiro (1990); Levin (1990).
2An example of mergers among private and public firms is observed among automobile manufacturers in Spain and
France.
3Some theoretical works show that in mixed markets public firms are more inefficient than private ones. For example,
see Matsumura and Matsushima (2004). In the paper, they show that the private firm’s cost becomes lower than the public
firm’s cost since the private one engages in excessive strategic cost-reducing activities in a Hotelling-type spatial model. In
the real world, it is well-known that the experiences of some countries, such as New Zealand and Great Britain provide
an adequate explanation to the assumption that public firms have higher costs of production. See Mizutani and Uranishi
(2003) for empirical studies.
4See DeFraja and Delbono (1989); Matsumura (1998).
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theory to our merger problem in a mixed oligopoly. Similar to Barros (1998), who analyzed a merger in a
private oligopoly market, we assume that participants for a merger have to agree with shareholding ratios
in the merged firm. The merged firm’s profit is distributed among them in proportion to their ratios.
Because the shareholding ratios are a mere device for distributing the profits among the owners in the
case of a merger between private firms, they do not influence the market outcome, such as price, profits,
and welfare. In contrast, in a merger involving a public firm, the shareholding ratios affect the market
outcomes because they have an impact on the objective of the merged firm in a way such that more the
ratio owned by the public owner (private owner) increases, the more that firm reflects welfare (its profit)
in its objective. This makes the analysis of a merger in a mixed oligopoly difficult in comparison with
the one in a private oligopoly by Barros (1998). The second characterization is derived from a policy
implication of a merger as privatization. Since the initial situation is a mixed oligopoly, we consider the
achievablity of a stable state from the initial situation. The achievablity of a stable state is simply defined
by the condition that some firms have an incentive to merge and induce the stable state from the initial
mixed oligopoly.
In literature, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) show that in a mixed duopoly, a´ la Cournot with
perfectly substitutable commodities, neither a private nor a public firm want to merge if there is no
improvement in production efficiency after the merger. This is intuitively explained as follows. Because a
merger weakens the competitive pressure in the market and there is no cost reduction through the merger,
the owner of the public firm agrees to merge with the private one only if the shareholding proportion of
the public owner in the merged firm is sufficiently high. On the other hand, the owner of the private
firm also agrees to merge only in the case of a large shareholding proportion because a decrease in the
proportion reduces not only the profit of the merged firm but also its allocation of the merged firm’s
profit. As a result, the interest of the private firm conflicts with that of the public one and they cannot
agree to merge for any shareholding ratios in the merged entity. In contrast, if a merger works towards
cost reduction for the less efficient public firm, this is not the case. the owner of the public firm has a
strong incentive to merge with the efficient private firm; he will compromise on the shareholding ratio
and accept a small proportion, making it possible for the owners of the public and private to agree with
the merger decisions. In fact, we show that such a merger will happen and achieve a stable state if the
cost reduction factor in a merger exists, irrespective of its value.
In this paper, we assume that the inverse demand function in the market is linear and that all firms
have constant marginal costs of production technologies. In addition, a public firm is assumed to be
inferior to a private one with respect to productivity. Our analysis revealed that the stable market
structures change according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm; however, we show that
there always exists a domain of shareholding proportions of the government, which changes in response
to the cost condition of the public firm, such that the state where a private and a public firm merge is in
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the core and is stable. Thus, we find that the owner of the public firm has the incentive to merge with a
private firm and the owners of private ones agree to the merger, irrespective of the marginal cost of the
public firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a model, and describe
four regimes: (a) no mergers, (b) merger between two private firms, (c) merger between a private and
a public firm, and (d) merger among all firms. Furthermore, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
values of various variables and the equilibrium payoffs of owners in each regime. In Section 3, we discuss
the stability problem for mergers among firms in a mixed oligopoly by adopting the core as the solution
concept. Moreover, we consider the achievablity of the stable market structures, i.e., which of the
structures is/are likely to emerge from the mixed oligopoly. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Model
We consider an industry consisting of two identical private firms and one public firm, both with a single
homogeneous output. Let q0 and qi denote the quantities of the public firm and private firm i, respectively
(i = 1, 2) and let Q = q0 +
∑2
i=1 qi denote the aggregate quantity of the market. The market price is
determined by the inverse demand function P = a−Q, where we assume that a is sufficiently large. Let
cj(qj), j = 0, 1, 2 denote a cost function of firm j. While the two private firms have constant and identical
marginal costs of production normalized to 0, the public firm is assumed to be less efficient than them
and its marginal cost is denoted by c > 0 and c ≤ a/3.5,6 Thus, c0(q0) = cq0 and ci(qi) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Since entry decisions are not considered, we assume that there are no fixed costs.
The profit of firm i is given by
pi0 = q0(a−Q)− cq0, and pii = qi(a−Q), i = 1, 2.
and social welfare W is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (CS = Q2/2) and the profits of the firms
(pii) in the market.
Let the owner of firm i be referred to as owner i. By the definition, owner 0 is from the public sector
and owners 1 and 2 are from the private sector. Following the literature, it is assumed that the public
sector is concerned with social welfare and thus public firm 0 is a welfare maximizer. On the other hand,
the private firms are assumed to be profit maximizers. When a public firm and private firms decide to
merge, the merged entity m is owned by two parties which have different objectives. Thus, this merged
firm m must consider both profit as well as social welfare. Let s ∈ [0, 1] denote the public sector’s
5There are studies on a mixed oligopoly with the constant marginal cost setting such as Mujumdar and Pal (1998), Pal
(1998), Matsumura (2003) and Lu (2006).
6It implies that a is sufficiently large to the extent that a ≥ 3c > 0. This assumption guarantees that each of the
equilibrium outputs of the public firm in all four regimes is positive or equal to 0.
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shareholding proportion in the merged firm and (1− s) ∈ [0, 1] denote the private sector’s proportion.
Then, following Matsumura (1998) and other studies related to partial privatization,7 we assume that
firm m maximizes
V (s, 1− s) = sW + (1− s)pim
where qm and pim = (a−Q)qm − cm(qm) is the amount of output and the profit of firm m, respectively.
Here the cost function of firm m, cm(qm), is defined by
min
∑
i∈S
ci(qi) s.t.
∑
i∈S
qi = qm and qi ≥ 0 for i ∈ S,
where S ⊆ {0, 1, 2} is a set of merger participants. Under the assumptions of constant marginal cost and
inefficient cost condition of the public firm, cm(qm) = 0 because S always includes one of the private
firms.
In what follows, we consider four types of regime classified by the merger: (a) no merger, i.e., in the
case where three firms compete in the market, (b) merger between two private firms, (c) merger between
a private firm and a public firm, and (d) merger among all firms. Let us denote the merged entity by
mS , where S is a set of the participants in the merger, and denote the shares of owner i in the merged
entity by si ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ S,
∑
i∈S si = 1.
(a) No merger
First, we consider a mixed triopoly with one public firm and two private firms, assuming that there is no
merger (or before the merger activity). In this case, private firm i chooses qi to maximize its own profit
pii while the public firm chooses q0 to maximize social welfare W = (q0 + q1 + q2)2/2 +
∑2
i=0 pii. Solving
these three problems simultaneously, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome for case (a) as
follows:
qa0 = a− 3c, qai = c, Qa = a− c, P a = c,
pia0 = 0, pi
a
i = c
2, W a =
a2 − 2ac+ 5c2
2
.
Here, we use the symbol a to denote the equilibrium corresponding to regime (a). In addition, in this case,
the payoffs of owner 0 and the private owner i (= 1, 2) are the equilibrium welfare and the equilibrium
profit of firm i, respectively. Thus, the payoffs of owner 0 and private owner i (= 1, 2) are given by
ua0 =W
a =
a2 − 2ac+ 5c2
2
, and uai = pi
a
i = c
2, (i = 1, 2).
7For example, Tomaru (2006) and Fujiwara (2006).
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(b) Merger between two private firms
Second, we consider the case that two private firms (two private owners) decide to merge. The market
structure after the merger is a mixed duopoly consisting of the public firm and the new ‘merged’ private
firm m12, where we use the notation m12 instead of m{1,2} for convenience. Social welfare, i.e., the
objective function of the public firm, is defined by W = (q0 + qm12)
2/2 + pi0 + pim12 . According to the
ownership of the firm, the objective of firm m12 is defined as the profit of the merged firm, pim12 . In the
equilibrium outcomes for regime (b), we obtain the following:
qb0 = a− 2c, qbm12 = c, Qb = a− c, P b = c,
pib0 = 0, pi
b
m12 = c
2, W b =
a2 − 2ac+ 3c2
2
.
In addition, the payoff of owner 0 is given by
ub0(s1, s2) =W
b =
a2 − 2ac+ 3c2
2
.
Let s1 = t and s2 = 1− t. Then, the payoffs of the private owner 1 and 2 are given by
ub1(s1, s2) = s1pi
b
m12 = tc
2, and ub2(s1, s2) = s2pi
b
m12 = (1− t)c2.
(c) Merger between a private firm and a public firm
Next, we consider the case in which a private and a public firm decide to merge. We assume that the
public firm 0 merges with private firm i. Thus, firm j = 1, 2, j 6= i is outside the merger. Social welfare
is given by W = (qm0i + qj)
2/2 + pim0i + pij . While firm j maximizes pij , the merged firm m0i maximizes
V (s0, si) = V (s, 1− s), where s0 = s and si = 1− s denote the ratios of the public owner 0 and private
owner i in the merged firm’s shareholding.
Solving maximization problem, given shares s, we now obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in regime
(c) as follows:
qcm0i =
a
3− 2s , q
c
j =
a (1− s)
3− 2s , Q
c =
a (2− s)
3− 2s , P
c =
a (1− s)
3− 2s ,
picm0i =
a2 (1− s)
(3− 2s)2 , pi
c
j =
a2 (1− s)2
(3− 2s)2 , W
c
m0i =
a2 (2− s) (4− 3s)
2 (3− 2s)2 ,
The payoffs of owner 0 and private owner i, who is inside the merger, are given by
uc0(s0, si) =W
c =
a2 (2− s) (4− 3s)
2 (3− 2s)2 , and u
c
i (s0, si) = (1− s0)picm0i =
a2 (1− s)2
(3− 2s)2 .
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In addition, since the payoff of private owner j who is outside the merger is the equilibrium profit of firm
j, it is given by
ucj(s0, si) = pi
c
j =
a2 (1− s)2
(3− 2s)2 .
Here, we find an interesting property. The payoff of the private owner i, who is a participant in the
merger, coincides with the payoff of another private owner j who is outside the merger. This property
plays an important role when the stability problem is considered.8
(d) Merger among all firms
Finally, we consider the case where all firms merge. Thus, the market becomes a public monopoly.9
In this regime, social welfare is defined by W = (qm012)
2/2 + pim012 . The merged firm m012 maximizes
V (s0, s1+ s2) = V (s, 1− s), where si denotes the shares of owner i and s = s0. Solving the maximization
problem, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in regime (d) as follows:
qdm012 =
a
2− s , P
d =
a (1− s)
2− s ,
pidm012 =
a2 (1− s)
(2− s)2 , W
d
m012 =
a2 (3− 2s)
2 (2− s)2 .
Given shares s, the payoff of owner 0 is defined as
ud0(s0, s1, s2) =W
d
m012 =
a2 (3− 2s)
2 (2− s)2 .
On the other hand, let t = s1/(1− s). Then, the payoffs of the private owner 1 and 2, are given by
ud1(s0, s1, s2) = (1− s)tpidm012 =
a2 (1− s)2 t
(2− s)2 ,
and
ud2(s0, s1, s2) = (1− s)(1− t)pidm012 =
a2 (1− s)2 (1− t)
(2− s)2 .
3 Core and stable market structures
First, we define a “market structure” of an economy in our model. The market structure depends on
the form of the merged firm. In particular, it is characterized as the following two things: which firms
participate in the merger and proportions of the owners’ shareholding in the merged firm. For notational
8This property holds as long as all private firms have symmetric constant marginal costs of production even if the number
of private firms is more than two. To be more precise, when there are n private firms and one public firm, and the public
firm and some of the private firms agree to merge, then, the distributed profits of the private owners of the merged firm
coincide with the profits of each outsider of this merger.
9Barros (1998) excludes merger for monopoly by assuming that the antitrust authority would not give clearance to such
a merger. However, we do not eliminate this case, because our focus is on stable states resulting from merger activities.
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convenience, we denote the merged firm between firms 0 and 1 by m01 and the market structure, where
firm 0 and 1 merge with the pair of proportions of shares, (0.4, 0.6), by ({0, 1}, (0.4, 0.6)). Thus, a set of
all the market structures is defined as
A :=
{
(T, s) : T ⊆ {0, 1, 2}, |T | ≥ 2, s = (si)i∈T ,
∑
i∈T
si = 1, si ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ T
}
∪ {M},
where |T | represents the cardinality of set T , and M denotes the market structure of the mixed triopoly
consisting of two symmetric private firms and one public firm. Note that based on the calculations in
the previous sections, for any market structure α in A, the payoff ui of owner i is determined as follows.
When α =M , ui(α) = uai for all i ∈ N . If α 6=M , for owner 0,
u0(α) =

ub0(s1, s2) if α = ({1, 2}, (s1, s2))
uc0(s0, sj) if α = ({0, j}, (s0, sj)) for some j = 1, 2,
ud0(s0, s1, s2) if α = (N, (s0, s1, s2)),
(1)
and for owner i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
ui(α) =

ubi (s1, s2) if α = ({1, 2}, (s1, s2))
uci (s0, si) if α = ({0, i}, (s0, si))
uci (s0, sj) if α = ({0, j}, (s0, sj))
udi (s0, s1, s2) if α = ({0, 1, 2}, (s0, s1, s2)).
(2)
Next, we define the inducement relation over the sets of all the market structures. A subset T of
N := {0, 1, 2} freely deviates from any market structure and then, the owners in T freely re-organize the
following two things:
(1) which firms in T merge and
(2) the proportions of the owners’ shareholding in the merged firm.
Thus, for instance, when all the owners deviate, they can induce any market structure from any other
market structure. On the other hand, in case of deviation of a single owner from the merger between the
three firms, we impose the following rule on the inducement relation for convenience: For instance, when
the owner of firm 2 deviates from the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (0.4, 0.5, 0.1)), firms 0 and 1 remain
merged and thus merged firm m01 exists with the pair of shares (0.4/ (0.4 + 0.5) , 0.5/ (0.4 + 0.5)).
Formally, the inducement relations →T over A are defined as follows:
• For i ∈ N ,
1. M →i M ,
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2. For any (R, s) ∈ A, if |R| = 2 and i ∈ R, then (R, s)→i M , and
3. For any (N, s) ∈ A, (N, s) →i (N\{i}, s′), where s′ = (s′j , s′k) is such that s′j = sjsj+sk and
s′k = 1− s′j .
• For T ⊂ N with |T | = 2,
1. For any α ∈ A, α→T M and
2. For any α ∈ A and for any (T, s) ∈ A, α→T (T, s).
• When T = N for any α ∈ A and any β ∈ A, α→T β.
Market structure α ∈ A is said to be blocked by another market structure β ∈ A via coalition T ⊆ N
if the following two conditions hold: (i) α →T β and (ii) ui(β) > ui(α) for all i ∈ T . Market structure
α is said to be blocked via coalition T if there exists another market structure β by which α is actually
blocked via coalition T . The core of A, denoted by C(A), is defined to be the set of the market structures
that are not blocked via any coalition.10
We now explore the stable market structures, i.e., the core of A, C(A). Our arguments proceed by
proving several lemmas. The first lemma shows that there are no shares of two private owners so that
the state where two private firms merge is in the core, C(A).
Lemma 1. For any t ∈ [0, 1], market structure ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)) does not belong to the core, C(A).
Proof. As we described in Section 2, when private owners 1 and 2 decide to merge with a pair of share
ratios of two private owners, (t, 1− t), they obtain tc2 and (1 − t)c2, respectively. On the other hand,
each of the two private owners receives c2 in the market structure M . Thus, either of them certainly
prefers the market structure M to ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)), and is able to induce M from ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)) for
himself. Therefore, market structure ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)) is blocked by M .
Lemma 1 shows that the merger of the two private firms brings no advantage to their owners, since
it only leads to the expansion of the market shares of the public firm.
Next, we argue whether the state where all the three firms merge, i.e., where the market is monopolized
by the firm m012 is in the core. The next lemma shows that there exist some shareholding proportions of
the three owners such that the state with the merger among the three firms is in the core. This lemma
is proved with the aid of Figures 1 and 2.
Lemma 2. When a(3 − √3)/9 ≤ c ≤ a/3, there exist s ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, 1] such that the market
structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) belongs to the core, C(A). Such s is less than or equal to
10In literature on applied economics, the core concept is broadly used, e.g., Riezman (1985) in the context of customs
unions in international economics, and Okada (2003) who analyzes international CO2 emissions trading in environmental
economics.
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s¯ = (5 − 3√2)/7 ≈ 0.11 and the shareholding proportion of private owner 1 is hardly different from the
one of private owner 2.11
Proof. First, we consider the deviation of the collusion of both the public owner 0 and private owner 1 (or
private owner 2) from the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))). The following analysis
are performed with the aid of Figure 1. Let curve AD in Figure 1 denote the locus between the payoff of
owner 0 uc0 (horizontal axis) and the payoff of private owner 1 u
c
1 (vertical axis) in the market structure
({0, 1}, (s′, (1− s′))) when s′ varies in the interval [0, 1] (A and D represent the states where s′ = 0 and
s′ = 1, respectively). In addition, let curve BD express the locus between the payoff of the public owner
ud0 (horizontal axis) and u
d
12/2 := (u
d
1 + u
d
2)/2 (vertical axis), i.e., the value when private owners 1 and 2
equally share (1− s)pidm012 and s varies in the interval [0, 1] (B and D indicate the states where s = 0 and
s = 1, respectively). Moreover, the share ratios of owner 0, i.e., s, at point E is s¯ = (5− 3√2)/7 ≈ 0.11.
We present the following claims:
Claim 1. Market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is blocked through the deviation of
coalition of two players, which consists of owner 0 and one of the private owners if s > s¯.
u0
a2
9
4a2
9
A
B
D
a2
2
a2
3
E
7a2
18
a2
8
C
F
uc1,
ud1+u
d
2
2
ub1 + u
b
2,
Figure 1: Relationship between the payoffs of the three owners in regimes (b), (c), and (d)
In Figure 1, the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1 − s)t, (1 − s)(1 − t))) with s > s¯ corresponds to
the region on curve ED except for point E (when the two private owners obtain equal payoffs). From
the figure, for any point on ED, there exist points on the curve AD, which is located in the region
upper right from the point. Thus, in the case where the proportions of two private owners’ share-
holding are equal, both public owner 0 and private owner 1 (or 2) can obtain better payoffs by estab-
11The concrete region of s and t in which the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is present in the core,
C(A) is given in Figure 2.
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lishing the firm m01 and adjusting the proportions of their shareholding in the firm, after deviating
from the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))). Hence when s > s¯, market structure
({0, 1, 2}, (s, 0.5(1− s), 0.5(1− s))) ∈ A is blocked. In addition, in the case where the shareholding pro-
portions of the two private owners are different, we select a coalition of the public owner and a private
owner who has lower shares in the firm than the other. Then, the locus between the payoffs of the public
owner and the private owner is located under the curve ED. After all, the state is blocked for the same
reason as the case where the share ratios of the two private owners are equal. Therefore, the market
structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is blocked if s > s¯.
On the other hand, the next claim asserts that there exist pairs (s, t) such that the state where the
three firms merge is not blocked by the one where a private and a public firm merge, if s ≤ s¯.
Claim 2. There exist s ≤ s¯ and t ∈ [0, 1] such that the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t)))
is not blocked through the deviation of coalition of two players, which consists of the public owner and
one of the two private owners.
If s ≤ s¯, from Figure 1, we find that owner 0 prefers the market structure with the merger between
firm 0 and 1 (or 2) to the market structure where all the three firms merge, irrespective of the proportion
of its shares. Therefore, we investigate only whether there is an incentive for the private owner 1 (or 2)
to merge his own firm with the public firm by deviating with the public owner. The payoff of the private
owner 1 (or 2) is a2/9 at the maximum when firm 1 (or 2) merges with the public firm. Thus, for s ≤ s¯,
if either
ud1 = (1− s)tpidm012 <
1
9
a2 or ud2 = (1− s)(1− t)pidm012 <
1
9
a2,
holds, the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is blocked by the deviation of coalition
of the two players of the public owner and the private owner, and the state is not in the core. On the
other hand, if the following two conditions hold:
ud1 ≥
1
9
a2 and ud2 ≥
1
9
a2,
then ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is unblocked by the deviation of the collusion of the two.12 The
pairs of s and t that satisfy the above conditions are found in the shaded area of Figure 2.
Finally, we show that the states corresponding to the shaded area of Figure 2 are present in the core
C(A) in the next claim if the marginal cost of the public firm c is relatively high, thus proving this lemma.
Claim 3. If a(3−√3)/9 ≤ c ≤ a/3, there exists a (s, t) pair in the shaded area of Figure 2 such that the
market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is in the core.
12These two conditions also hold since each of the two private owners cannot obtain the payoff more than a2/9 by
assuming the marginal cost of the public firm, 0 < c ≤ a/3, even if the public owner 0 and private owner 1 (or 2) induce
the state M after deviating from ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))), as in the following analysis.
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In order to prove this claim, by the claim 2, it is enough to show that neither a coalition of two private
owners, a single player coalition of a private owner, nor a single player coalition of owner 0 block the
market structure with the pair (s, t) in the shaded area.13
s
s¯
t
5/9
1/2
4/9
(1− s)(1− t)pidm012 ≥ 19a2
(1− s)tpidm012 ≥ 19a2
Figure 2: The domain of s and t such that the state where the three firms merge is in the core
First we have to check the possibility of deviation such that all the owners in the merged firm simply
change their shareholding ratios. It is easily verified that ud0 is increasing in s and u
d
i (i = 1, 2) is
decreasing in s. Moreover, ud1 is increasing in t and u
d
2 is decreasing in t. Thus, such a deviation does
not succeed.
Next, we explore the possibility of the deviation of the coalition of two private owners. Since both
private owners 1 and 2 obtain c2 in the market structure M and the payoffs are less than or equal to
c2 in the market structure ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)), it blocks the market structure of the merger among all the
three firms only if ud1 < c
2 or ud2 < c
2. However, in the corresponding area of the market structure
({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))), both private owners 1 and 2 can obtain the payoffs more than or
equal to a2/9 (≥ c2) by the assumption of the marginal cost of the public firm, a/3 ≥ c > 0. Thus, it
cannot block the market structure of the merger among all the three firms with the shares in the area.
Furthermore, if a private owner deviates, he obtains a payoff which is equal to the payoff of another
private owner.14 Thus, the private owner cannot acquire a payoff of more than a2/9. Therefore, it is
impossible for the deviation of a single private owner to block the market structure of the merger among
the three firms in the corresponding area.
Finally, we investigate whether the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is blocked
via a single player coalition of the public owner. Social welfare depends on the marginal cost of the public
13Note that if the state where all the firms merge with some pair of shares of the three owners belongs to the core C(A),
it is not blocked by redistributing the shares of their owners in the merger among the three firms as is clear from Figure 1.
14We have already explained this property in regime (c) in Section 2.
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firm c after it ceases the merger with two private firms. Let the curve CD in Figure 1 denote the locus
between the payoff of owner 0 ub0 and the sum of those of two private owners u
b
12 := u
b
1 + u
b
2 = c
2 in the
market structure ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)), when the marginal cost of the public firm c changes in the interval
(0, a/3] (C and D represent the states where c = a/3 and where c = 0, respectively). When the value
of c varies on the curve FD (note that F is not included), we find that the state in the shaded area
in Figure 2 is blocked by the market structure ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)) induced by the public owner. On the
contrary, when the value of c changes on the curve CF , the state where the public owner’s shareholding
proportion, s is near s¯ ( e.g., s = s¯, t = 0.5) is unblocked and is in C(A). We obtain c = a(3 − √3)/9
as the value of c on F by solving (a2 − 2ac + 3c2)/2 = 7a2/18. That is, if c ≥ a(3 −√3)/9, there exist
combinations of values of s and t such that the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is
not blocked by any other state.
Lemma 2 describes that the shareholding proportions of the three owners in the firm m012, such that
the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is in the core, vary depending on the value of
the marginal cost of the public firm, c. The larger the value of c ∈ [a(3−√3)/9, a/3] is, the weaker the
incentive for deviation of the public owner is. As the value of c approaches to a/3, the domain of the pairs
of s and t in which the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is in the core is broader
than the one in which c is relatively small compared to a/3. Note that the public owner prefers the merger
between a single private and a public firm to the merger of three firms because the addition of a private
firm to the two firms’ merger only results in deteriorating the competitive pressure without improving the
production efficiency. However, once the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) with the
values of s and t in Figure 2 is established, both private owners have no incentives to accept the proposal of
the deviation by the public owner, since they obtain relatively high payoffs. On the other hand, social wel-
fare is non-incremented if the public owner deviates on its own from ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t)))
with the values of s and t in Figure 2 (the domain of s and t broadens as the value of c become higher),
when a(3−√3)/9 ≤ c ≤ a/3, because the negative effect of the inefficiency of the public firm overshadows
the positive effect of the increase of the competitive pressure in the market.
Next, we explore whether the state where a single private and a public firm merge is in the core C(A).
The following lemma holds, and we obtain a positive result.
Lemma 3. When 0 < c ≤ a/3, there exists s ∈ [0, 1] such that the market structure ({0, i}, (s, 1− s)) , (i =
1, 2) belongs to the core C(A).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume i = 1 in advance of the proof of this lemma. First, we show
that the state where a single private and a public firm merge is not blocked by the market structure of
the merger among all the three firms. Let us consider a point on curve AD in Figure 3 and call it F .
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Note that F corresponds to a pair of payoffs of public owner 0 and private owner 1 in regime (c) for some
of their shares. By the definition of blocking, the payoff of the public owner has to be strictly improved
by the merger of the three firms. Note again that the curve BD denotes the locus between the payoff
of the public owner ud0 and u
d
12 := (u
d
1 + u
d
2)/2 in the market structure of the merger of the three firms.
Thus, to enhance the payoff of the public owner through the merger of the three firms, its shares and
payoff in the merged firm must correspond to the point on the curve BD, which is lower right to point
F (see Figure 3). Let us consider such a point and call it point G.
Here, we find that the value of the vertical axis of point G is always lower than that of point F .
This implies that the payoff of the private owner 1 in the initial situation (on point F ) is lower than the
average of the payoffs of private owners 1 and 2 in the state of the three firms’ merger corresponding to
point G. In the market structure ({0, 1}, (s, 1− s)), since the private owner 2 obtains the same payoff
as that of the private owner 1 (see regime (c) in Section 2), the payoff of one of the two private owners
certainly decreases by the deviation from F to G. Therefore, the market structure ({0, 1}, (s, 1− s)) is
not blocked in the state where all the three firms merge.
u0
a2
9
4a2
9
A
B
D
a2
2
a2
3
E
7a2
18
a2
8
C
initial point F
point G where the public sector
becomes better off
uc1,
ud1+u
d
2
2
Figure 3: Relationship between the payoffs of the three owners in the regimes (c) and (d)
Next, we investigate whether the market structure ({0, 1}, (s, 1− s)) is blocked by the single player
deviation of the public owner 0 or private owner 1. The arguments presented below proceed with the
aid of Figure 4. Let the upper right curve connecting A and D in Figure 4 denote the locus between
the payoff of the public owner and that of private owners in regime (c) when s varies from 0 to 1. On
the other hand, let the left under curve connecting A and D express the locus between the payoff of the
public owner and that of private owners in regime (a) when the marginal cost c varies from 0 to a/3 (A
represents the state where c = a/3 and D is the one where c = 0). Here, note that c2 ≤ a2/9 by the
assumption of the marginal cost of the public firm.
From Figure 4, we find that for any point on the left under curve AD, there exist points on the upper
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Figure 4: Relationship between the payoffs of the three owners in the regimes (a), (c), and (d)
right of the curve AD, which is located upper right to or at the same point. This means that for any
value of c, there exist some s ∈ [0, 1] such that the market structure ({0, 1}, (s, 1− s)) is not blocked by a
single player deviation of the public owner 0 or private owner 1. In addition, it is obvious that the state
of the merger between a private and a public firm with such shareholding proportions is also unblocked
by the market structure ({1, 2}, (t, 1− t)) via the coalition of the two private owners.15
We consider the deviation of the coalition of two players of the public owner 0 and private owner 2
from the merger between the public owner 0 and private owner 1. Note that by observing regime (c) in
the previous section, the private owner 2 obtains the same payoff as that of the private owner 1 in the
market structure ({0, 1}, (s, 1− s)). This fact shows that blocking by such deviation does not succeed.16
Finally, we investigate the deviation such that the public and private owners in the merged firm
simply change their shareholding ratios. As is described in the curve AD in Figure 4, each owner wants
his larger proportion in the merged firm. Thus, the deviation of the two owners in the merged firm does
not succeed.
From Lemma 3, we can infer that there exist pairs of share proportions of the public owner 0 and
private owner i such that the market structure ({0, i}, (s, 1− s)) , (i = 1, 2) always belongs to the core
C(A), as long as c > 0. When the marginal cost of the public firm c is higher, the states with the merger,
which is of advantage to a private owner, are in the core. On the other hand, as c decreases, the states
where the two owners’ shareholding proportions in the merged firm are favorable to the public owner are
introduced in the core C(A). The payoff of the public owner (or social welfare) in regime (c) is higher
15See the relation between the curve AD and CD in Figure 1.
16Consider that curve AD, which denotes the state in the merger between a private and a public firm, is downward-sloping
in Figure 3 and 4. Thus, the state where a private and a public firm merge is not blocked by re-allocating the shareholding
proportions of the public owner and the one private owner.
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than or equal to the one in regime (d) to the same value of s.17 Therefore, to improve the payoff of
the public owner by inducing the state where all the three firms merge, the value of s must be higher
than those of the original state, i.e., the state where a private and a public firm merge. However, this
results in decreasing the payoff of at least one private owner. This is the reason that the market structure
({0, i}, (s, 1− s)) , (i = 1, 2) is unblocked through the state where the three firms merge. On the other
hand, in a mixed triopoly, the existence of the public firm whose productivity is worse compared to that
of the two private firms incurs the state with comparatively low social welfare. In addition, in the state
where a private and a public firm merge, both private owners can acquire the payoffs that are equal to
and higher than the ones in regime (a) by coordinating the shareholding proportions of the public owner
and the private owner in the merged firm. Thus, the market structure ({0, i}, (s, 1− s)) , (i = 1, 2) is not
blocked by the deviation of a single player, i.e., the public owner or the private owner.
Finally, we confirm whether the market structure M belongs to the core.
Lemma 4. When c = a/3, market structure M belongs to the core, C(A).
Proof. When 0 < c < a/3, from Figure 4, we find that the market structureM is blocked by ({0, i}, (s, 1−
s)) via the coalition consisting of the public owner 0 and private owner i, (i = 1, 2). On the contrary,
when c = a/3, Point A in Figure 4 denotes each of the owners’ payoffs in the mixed triopoly. Thus, the
payoff of the public owner is 4a2/9, whereas that of the private owner is a2/9. It is easily verified that the
state of the mixed triopoly on A is unblocked by any other market structure induced by all deviations of
owners.
In the mixed triopoly, when c = a/3, each of the two private owners obtains the highest payoff equal to
a2/9, since the public firm exits from the market. Thus, to enhance the payoffs of the two private owners,
it is necessary that the shares of the public owner in the three-firm merger is low enough. However, it
is inevitable that the decrease of s results in deteriorating social welfare, i.e., the payoff of the public
owner. Therefore, the mixed triopoly is not blocked by any other state.
To state the following proposition, we must prepare some words and notions. If a market structure is
in the core, we call it a stable market structure. In addition, merger T (⊆ N) is stable if there exist some
proportions of each owner’s shareholding s = (si)i∈S such that
(T, s) ∈ C(A).
17This property is confirmed by the following easy calculation.
uc0 − ud0 =
a2(1− s)3(5− 3s)
2(6− 7s+ 2s2)2 ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ [0, 1].
Note that uc0 − ud0 is equal to zero when s = 1.
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Moreover, the state of the mixed triopoly is stable if
M ∈ C(A).
We obtain the next proposition according to the above-mentioned analysis.
Proposition 1. Stable mergers are classified into three cases depending on the value of the marginal cost
of the public firm c.
1. When c = a/3, four states of M , merger {0, i}, (i = 1, 2), and {0, 1, 2} are stable.
2. When a(3−√3)/9 ≤ c < a/3, three states of merger {0, i}, (i = 1, 2), and {0, 1, 2} are stable.
3. When 0 < c < a(3−√3)/9, two states of merger {0, i}, (i = 1, 2) are stable.
We explain the intuitions behind Proposition 1 as follows. First, the market structure M is stable,
only if the marginal cost of the public firm is the highest, i.e., c = a/3 to the degree that the public firm
exits from the market. In this state, the two private owners obtain relatively high payoffs because of the
existence of the public firm whose productivity is low. Thus, the public owner wishes a merger with a
private firm for improving its productivity, however, when c = a/3, both private owners disagree on the
merger, no matter how much the public owner makes concession to the shareholding proportion in the
merged firm. As the marginal cost of the public firm is lower than c = a/3, the market structure M
is blocked by ({0, i}, (s, 1− s)) via coalition of two players consisting of the public owner 0 and private
owner i, (i = 1, 2) and is not in the core. In addition, from the viewpoint of the public owner, the
productivity of the public firm is higher when it merges with a single private firm, because the merger
with two private firms deteriorates social welfare by reducing the competitive pressure. Considering this
fact, we can find the reason why the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) is in the core
when the marginal cost of the public firm is under the high and middle level. If the sum of the two private
owners’ shareholding proportions is high, a single private owner can share a relatively high payoff with
another private owner. Thus, there are no incentives for both private owners to deviate with the public
owner and induce the state where a private and a public firm merge, although the public owner wants to
merge with a single private firm. Moreover, when the productivity of the public firm is bad, social welfare
deteriorates even if the public owner deviates on its loan from the state where the three firms merge.
That is, when c is relatively high and the shares of the public owner in the three-firm merger are low, it is
a clever choice for the public owner to leave the situation as it stands. In other words, the public owner
is too inefficient to deviate on its own from the state where all the three firms merge. On the contrary,
the market structure ({0, 1, 2}, (s, (1− s)t, (1− s)(1− t))) does not belong to the core when the marginal
cost of the public firm is under the low level, since the public owner does not have any incentive to merge
with the two private firms because of the cutdown on the improvement of its productivity.
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Finally, we check which states in the core are most likely to occur. Although it is quite a difficult
question theoretically, we can provide a reasonable answer because we have additional information on an
initial situation by viewing a merger as “privatization.” Since the initial situation is a mixed triopoly of
one public firm and two private firms, we focus on the elements of the core that block the initial mixed
triopoly. A market structure α ∈ A is said to be achievable from initial situation M if M is blocked by α
via some coalition T . A merger among T ⊆ N is said to be stable and achievable from M if there exists
a market structure α = (T, s) ∈ A, such that it is stable as well as achievable from the initial situation
M . The following proposition shows that only the two-firm merger between a public and private firm is
likely to occur as a result of the merger activity from the mixed triopoly.
Proposition 2. For any c ∈ (0, a/3), only the two-firm merger {0, i}, i = 1, 2, is stable and achievable
from an initial mixed triopoly.
Proof. By the proof of Lemmas 3 and 4, if ({0, i}, s) ∈ A belongs to the core, it blocks M for any
c ∈ (0, a/3).
Next we show that (N, s) ∈ C(A) is not achievable fromM . By Lemma 2, the stable market structure
(N, s) is on the curved segment BE of Figure 4. Because the pair of payoffs of the public owner and the
private owner in the initial mixed triopoly M is expressed by the under left curve AD, the public owner
always prefers M to (N, s) on the curved segment BE.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate what market structures are stable using the core theory when firms are
allowed to merge with each other in a mixed oligopoly where one public and two symmetric private ones
exist. First, we show that the stable market structures in the core are classified into three cases depending
on the degree of the marginal cost of the public firm. Then, although multiple types of merger are stable
for some range of the marginal cost of the public firm (a(3−√3)/9 ≤ c ≤ a/3), a stable and achievable
merger from an initial mixed oligopoly is only the merger between one public and one private firm. Thus,
this state tends to occur after the merger activity of the firms.
We discuss three features of stable market structures belonging to the core. First, the state where a
single private and a public firm merge belongs to the core in all three cases. According to this fact, we can
recognize the state where the public firm is built into the private firm at a constant rate, i.e., absorbed
into the private one as stable. We succeed to show “the (partial) acquisition of an inefficient public firm
by a private one” is certainly adequate. Second the state where all the three firms merge is in the core
when the marginal cost of the public firm is under the high and middle level. This is because the public
owner whose payoff is social welfare wishes to enhance the productivity of the public firm through the
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merger at the expense of deteriorating consumer surplus by declining the aggregate quantity, resulting in
the monopoly of the merged firm. This clearly demonstrates that the enhancement of the cost condition
of the public firm is more important for the public owner than the disadvantage of the monopoly, when
the marginal cost of the public firm is relatively high. Finally, the state in the mixed triopoly belongs
to the core only if the marginal cost of the public firm is the highest, i.e., c = a/3, to the extent that
the public firm exits from the market. Therefore, the state that actually occurs, is a private duopoly
composed of firms 1 and 2. We find that each owner of two private firms does not assent to all deviations
from the mixed triopoly by considering that they obtains comparatively high payoffs due to the disparity
of productivity between a private and a public firm. As long as we address the stability problem from
the viewpoint of the core theory, under the assumption that the public firm is more inefficient than
the private ones, this problem occurs. In this state, we must pay attention about the fact that any
privatization policy is meaningless because the public firm actually exits from the production market.
Extremely inefficient firms should be discarded even though they are public firms.
Two interesting extensions remain. First is the analysis in which the number of firms is generalized.
In this paper, we assume that there exist one public and two private firms. Thus, we must confirm what
incentives of mergers for firms’ owners occur in the model where more than three generalized numbered
firms exist in the market. However, it is conjectured that the results of the generalized model are almost
the same as ours. For example, when we consider a mixed oligopoly model with one public and n ≥ 1
symmetric private firms analogous to Pal (1998), the state where a public and a single private firm merge
tends to be in the core, and the one where all firms merge and no merger (i.e., an original mixed oligopoly)
probably belongs to the core when a public firm has relatively low productivity.
More importantly, second is how a cost function of a merged firm should be treated. We assume that
in advance of our analysis when a private and a public firm merge into a new firm, the merged firm can
produce with the technology of the private firm whose productivity is higher, independent of the public
owner’s shareholding proportion in the merged firm, similar to many existing works in the context of
mergers in a private oligopoly. This assumption on the cost function of the merged firm may be adequate
when it denotes the production technology of the firm itself (for example, the performance of machines
in the plant, etc). On the contrary, we also assume that a public firm is more inefficient than a private
one. If the inefficiency of a public firm expresses the intrinsic one such as X-inefficiency, the assumption
that the merged firm can use the more efficient technology, may not be appropriate. In this case, one
may consider that the assumption that the productivity of the merged firm has deteriorated in response
to the increase in the proportion of the public owner’s shareholding is adequate. Extending our model in
these directions remains a subject for future research.
19
References
Ba´rcena-Ruiz, J.C., Garzo´n, M.B., 2003. Mixed duopoly, merger and multiproduct firms. J Econ. 80,
27–42.
Barros, P.P., 1998. Endogenous merger and size asymmetry of merger participants. Econ Lett. 60, 113–
119.
De Fraja, G., Delbono, F., 1989. Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly. Oxford Econ
Pap. 41, 302–311.
Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 1990. Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. Am Econ Rev. 80, 107–126.
Fujiwara, K., 2006. Trade patterns in an international mixed oligopoly. Econ Bull. 1–7.
Levin, D., 1990. Horizontal mergers: The 50-percent benchmark. Am Econ Rev. 80, 1238–1245.
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors: The linear demand case. J Econ. 88,
49–67.
Matsumura, T., 1998. Partial privatization in mixed duopoly. J Public Econ. 70, 473–483.
., 2003. Endogenous role in mixed markets: A two-production Period model. South Econ J. 70,
403–413.
Matsumura, T., Matsushima, N., 2004. Endogenous cost differentiations between public and private
enterprises. Economica. 71, 671–688.
Mizutani, F., Uranishi, S., 2003. The post office v.s. percel delivery companies: Competition effects on
costs and productivity. J Regul Econ. 23, 299–319.
Mujumdar, S., Pal, D., 1998. Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly. Econ Lett. 58, 199–204.
Okada, A., 2003. A market game analysis of international CO2 emissions trading: Evaluating initial
allocation rules. In: Sawa, T. (Eds), International Frameworks and Technological Strategies to Prevent
Climate Change, Springer-Verlag, pp. 3–21.
Pal, D., 1998. Endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly. Econ Lett. 61, 181–185.
Perry, M.K., Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligoply and the incentive for horizontal merger. Am Econ Rev. 75,
219–227.
Riezman, R., 1985. Customs unions and the core. J Int Econ. 19, 355–365.
Salant, S.W., Switzer, S., and Reynolds, R.J., 1983. Losses from horizontal Merger: The effects of an
exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Q J Econ. 98, 185–199.
20
Tomaru, Y., 2006. Mixed oligopoly, partial privatization and subsidization. Econ Bull. 12, 1–6.
21
